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TRANSCRIPT OF PANEL DISCUSSION-
TRANSACTIONAL ECONOMICS: VICTOR
GOLDBERG'S FRAMING CONTRACT LAW*
Mark P. Gergen, Victor Goldberg,
Stewart Macaulay, Keith A. Rowley
Professor Mark Gergen?
Thank you. It is an honor to speak to this group and to be on a
panel with Stewart Macaulay, Keith Rowley, and Victor Goldberg. I
have an enormous amount of respect for the three. Keith had the
misfortune of being a student of mine in Federal Income Tax.
Framing Contract Law2 offers a wealth of information about
familiar cases. Victor argues that in construing contracts, courts
should be attentive to how people engineer contracts to minimize
transaction costs. He shows that courts often err in this regard,
imposing unnecessary costs. To make his case, Victor delves deeply
into the background of cases, many that will be familiar to anyone
who has taught contracts, and turns up much that is new and
interesting. I am going to follow Victor's lead by focusing on two cases
that he discusses. I will briefly summarize what he says about the
cases. I will then use the cases as a springboard to make my points,
which are different from Victor's points.
The first case I want to discuss is Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp.,3 a case many use to teach the duty to mitigate. Victor
makes a convincing case that the mitigation issue is spurious. The
contract in Parker had what Victor describes as a standard "pay-or-
play" term that limited the studio's obligation to the minimum
guarantee of $750,000. According to Victor, the minimum guarantee
* This panel discussion was held at the Third International Conference on Contracts
at South Texas College of Law in February 2007.
1. Professor Mark P. Gergen is the Fondren Foundation Centennial Chair for
Faculty Excellence at the University of Texas School of Law.
2. VICrOR GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACr LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECrIVE
(2006).
3. 474 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1970); GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 277-312.
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protected the talent from the opportunity cost of committing to a film
while giving the studio the option to cancel. Studios need this option
because they do not know if they want to proceed with a film until
they are fairly deep into the project. The minimum guarantee is
similar to the purchase price of an option on the actor's time or to a
capacity payment. If this is correct, then the mitigation issue is
spurious. When an option is not exercised, the grantor is entitled to
the price paid for the option and has no duty to mitigate by making a
substitute transaction. Ironically, the trial court got it right-ruling for
MacLaine on this basis-and then this ground for the decision drops
out of the case as it goes up on appeal all the way to the California
Supreme Court.
Victor's discussion of Parker raises several provocative points.
One point is in the spirit of Richard Danzig's book, The Capability
Problem in Contract Law,' for Parker is a case study of how appellate
decisions ignore and distort the facts of a case. A second point is in the
spirit of Stewart Macaulay's casebook, Contracts: Law in Action! In
Parker, the studio acted opportunistically by invoking the duty to
mitigate to try to welch on its obligation to pay the minimum
guarantee. Studios did this in many instances, losing every time, which
says a great deal about the mores of the film industry and the relative
power of studios and stars. A third point, also in the spirit of the
Macaulay casebook's gritty realism,6 is that MacLaine's counsel did a
poor job by allowing the legal issue to be improperly framed on
appeal. The appellate judges appear not to have understood the basis
for the trial court's opinion. Such bumbling makes one despair for the
system, although in the end every court reached the correct result.
A point Victor makes in the next chapter of the book, which is
about Wasserman's Inc. v. Township of Middletown,7 lies in the
background of Parker once the minimum guarantee is understood as
an option payment. Victor makes the comparison between an
alternative performance term and a liquidated damage clause. Had
the contract in Parker required that MacLaine be paid the fee as
liquidated damages in the event of breach, then the contract might
have been invalidated-assuming she took comparable work in the
committed time-because payment of liquidated damages would then
4. RICHARD DANZIG, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW (1978).
5. STEWART MACAULAY, JOHN KIDWELL & WILLIAM WHITFORD, CONTRACTS:
LAW IN ACTION (2d ed. 2003).
6. I use the Macaulay book because it combines realism with a nuanced
understanding of legal doctrine.
7. 645 A.2d 100 (N.J. 1994); GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 313-24.
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plainly result in overcompensation.
This legal risk is avoided if the obligation is characterized as an
option payment rather than as an obligation to pay liquidated
damages. The two are often functional equivalents. Why does the law
treat them differently? And why do people use liquidated damage
clauses when they could use option payments to achieve the same
result without legal risk? Of course, even if people use an option
payment, there is a risk that a court will analyze it as a penalty clause.
This happened in Wasserman's, and Victor argues it was a mistake
(the chapter is subtitled "The Penalty Clause that Wasn't"). I gather
that Victor has an article in the works on Lake River Corp. v.
Carborundum Co.' making the same point. In that case, Judge Posner
invalidated as a penalty clause what appears to be a "take-or-pay"
term or a capacity payment.
Set the book aside for a moment. I use Parker to make a different
point. I take the case on the California Supreme Court's terms and use
it to make a simple point about the duty to mitigate. Parker is
additional evidence, if you need it, that the theory of efficient breach
is descriptively inaccurate. The case shows that the interest in
vindicating rights and remedial simplicity trump the interest in
efficient performance. Had MacLaine taken the offered role in Big
Man, Big Country, she would have been left with an uncompensated
loss, assuming she preferred the role in Bloomer Girl for aesthetic or
political reasons. The law would not compensate her for that loss
because it was too difficult to value. Instead the law allowed
MacLaine to reject the role and collect the promised compensation.
This gave MacLaine a windfall-pay without work-and created
inefficient performance incentives. The law lives with this inefficiency,
preferring to vindicate MacLaine's rights in a way that does not
require litigation. Indeed, the precise holding of Parker is that
summary judgment is appropriate even though reasonable people
might disagree about the merit and weight of MacLaine's reasons for
turning down the substitute role. Again, the law errs on the side of
vindicating MacLaine's rights in order to avoid a jury trial. The rule I
take from Parker is that a party may refuse substitute nonconforming
performance to avoid suffering an uncompensated loss, although the
refusal inflicts a disproportionate loss on the defaulter.
8. 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985).
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The case of Bomberger v. McKelvey 9 better illustrates my point; it
is a counterpoint to Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co.,'° which
is in many casebooks. If you teach the duty to mitigate using Luten
Bridge, I hope you tell your students the case is unrepresentative. The
question was whether a party should halt performance when the other
party repudiated and refused to perform. Usually, unlike in Luten
Bridge, the party is allowed to complete performance and collect the
contract price if he has any credible interest in doing so. So it was in
Bomberger. Bomberger signed a contract with McKelvey to convey a
lot after tearing down an existing building. After the contract was
made, Bomberger entered into another contract that required he use
skylights from the building he was to tear down. McKelvey repudiated
before Bomberger tore down the building. Bomberger went ahead
and tore down the building and sued for the contract price tendering
the vacant lot. He won. The court reasoned that had he not torn down
the building, he would have been in breach of the other contract, for it
would have taken several months to procure substitute skylights (this
was immediately after World War II). There is no suggestion in the
opinion of any specific pecuniary loss to Bomberger from a delay on
the other contract. The building he tore down was worth $26,000 and
was generating $300 in monthly rent. This is a wonderful illustration
of my point. In American contract law, we will tolerate a great deal of
inefficiency to put somebody in the promised position while
minimizing administrative costs. Or, as I said, the interest in
vindicating rights and remedial simplicity trump the interest in
efficient performance.
I do not think Victor would take exception to this point. A
general theme of his book is that we would be better off with simple
rules that define people's contractual obligations, or the lack thereof,
in ways that do not vest courts with adjudicative discretion and so
invite litigation. Like many others, Victor has a dim view of litigation
and of courts' capacity to improve contracts.
The chapter on Glanzer v. Shepard" raises a related and
fundamental question about the purpose of privity law. This is a
famous Cardozo opinion holding a coffee bean weigher liable to a
buyer who overpaid for beans as a result of a weighing error. Victor
examines surveyor liability more generally. I would have said assayers
or assessors-these are intermediaries who determine the value or
9. 220 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1950).
10. 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929).
11. 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922); GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at'245-78.
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sufficiency of performance. Some surveyor errors merely result in
overpayment or underpayment, as in Glanzer; others are more
consequential. An example from the chapter is in ship classification
societies whose error may lead to loss of life or property.
Victor makes several points in this chapter. One point is that
when people bother to resolve the issue of liability for a surveyor's
error by contract, they usually opt for rules of no liability. Those rules
make the surveyor's decision final and binding as between the parties
and exculpate the surveyor from liability to the party harmed by the
error. Victor has to dig hard to find this out, for judicial decisions
often do not report relevant contract terms. He also finds an
interesting pattern in the cases. Courts generally point out that
exculpatory terms are invalid but then absolve a surveyor of liability
for consequential damages on other grounds, such as the
disproportionality of the surveyor's compensation to the liability.
Judges appear to want to reserve the power to police exculpatory
terms. Victor explains why rules of no liability are optimal. When a
bean weigher errs, there is no social loss-an over- or underpayment
is merely a shift in wealth. Further, these shifts in wealth tend to be
small and to even out over the long term. It is not worth expending
resources to avoid such mistakes or to identify them after they occur.
Victor also finds that coffee weighers do not try to resolve their
legal liability by contract (with the exception of coffee traded on one
exchange). When they do resolve mistakes, often it is without
reference to their contract or to the law. In the petroleum industry,
surveyors disclaim liability on their price list, while oil traders oppose
this limitation in their acknowledgement forms. Victor thinks oil
traders would win in the battle of the forms if the issue was ever
litigated. My impression is that people are willing to do business with
this issue unresolved, even though it invites litigation.
This raises a provocative question. What if the liability rule in
Glanzer has no material effect on people's primary behavior? It does
not seem to affect how they write contracts. Therefore, one suspects it
does not affect their performance, for if it did, they would rewrite the
contracts to ensure no liability for the reasons Victor gives. I am fairly
confident that Victor would say this is an additional reason for a no
liability rule. Litigation to resolve liability for an accident is a
deadweight loss if the prospect of liability does not reduce the
incidence of accidents. I am assuming there is no distributive
justification for the liability, such as loss-spreading. This conclusion
implicitly denies any value to doing what seems fair. While this may
be right as a matter of policy, it is deeply unrealistic. It is difficult for
2007]
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judges, in particular trial judges who deal directly with the parties, to
suppress the instinct to do what seems fair as between the parties in a
particular case. Much of contract law consists of judges saving people
from drafting mistakes, particularly when enforcing a contract as
written would give one party a windfall at the other's expense. The
law on penalty clauses illustrates this fact. After reviewing a decade of
cases, I found that in the majority of cases that invalidated a
liquidated damage clause, the courts saved the parties from the effect
of a poorly drafted clause that, if enforced, would give a windfall to
one party at the other's expense. This same scenario comes into play
across much of the Dawson, Harvey, and Henderson casebook. 3 Jack
Dawson understood as well as anyone in the twentieth century that
much of contract law (and, of course, restitution law) is explained by
this instinct to fairness.
Victor urges judges to resist the instinct to fairness. Victor's view
is that if adults want to make mistakes, they should be allowed. The
deadweight loss of litigation is not worth cleaning up afterwards.
When I was younger, I wrote an article arguing that some
interventions may be efficient because the prospect of intervention
reduces the cost of contracting and sometimes eliminates an incentive
for inefficient behavior in contract performance."' I conceded that the
argument was not very compelling. Whether intervention is efficient
depends on courts' capacity to identify mistakes, the likelihood that
people make errors in drafting contracts, and the sensitivity to the law
while drafting and executing contracts. At best, the efficiency
argument is a wash. If, like Victor, you think of drafting contracts as
"transaction cost engineering," and you have a low opinion of the
litigation system, then the efficiency argument is a non-starter.
Victor joins Bob Scott in advocating a radical simplification of
contract law. I expect Victor would restore something like the "plain
meaning" and "four corners" rules in contract interpretation. He
would rip out much of the law of waiver and estoppel, vitiate the
duties of good faith and best efforts, and enforce liquidated damage
clauses as written. I expect he would eliminate many of the doctrines
invoked to avoid forfeiture. 5 These changes may seem right if we
12. See Mark P. Gergen, A Defense of Judicial Reconstruction of Contracts, 71 IND.
L.J. 45, 55 (1995).
13. JOHN P. DAWSON, WILLIAM BURNETr HARVEY & STANLEY D. HENDERSON,
CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS (4th ed. 1982).
14. Gergen, supra note 12, at 45-46.
15. The battle of the forms is one exception. In Chapter 8, Victor recommends that
judges opt for the least obnoxious term. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 196.
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accept Victor's normative and factual premises. Even accepting these
premises, these changes are right only if we can count on judges and
juries to stay with the program and suppress this instinct to fairness. If
we make these changes and judges and juries continue to do what they
have always done, then we will return to something similar to contract
law when the realists found it. A body of law would exist consisting of
rules that appear to constrain judges and juries and occasional
outcomes that bend the rules to do what is fair. Perhaps this would be
an improvement over a body of law that openly vests judges with
discretion. But I have not seen anyone make this case.
Again, Framing Contract Law is an important and interesting
book. You will learn much from reading it. I turn the proceedings
over to Stewart Macaulay.
Professor Stewart Macaulay: 6
I am pleased to be here. I see a lot of old friends. My role as
discussant means that I will really pay attention to this important
book. You will notice that I have put a number of text flags to mark
passages, and I have underlined many things in my copy. I think that
Victor's book should be read, and Contracts teachers must confront
its arguments. We have to look at it, and we are sure to learn a lot.
I may come advertised as a person whose work is opposed to
Victor's positions. I have a reprint of one of my articles from January
of 2003, and it bears the title The Real and the Paper Deal.7 My
subtitle says that I see that empirical pictures of relationships work
against the urge to fashion transparent simple rules. I often find
myself defending Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
while recognizing many of its problems. However, despite my
reputation, I like Victor's book. We may come to different
conclusions here or there, but I think that Victor and I are arguing
about the right things. We agree that the more we know about a
transaction, the better we can fashion a solution to its problems. An
empirical approach does not guarantee agreement, but it usually
means that we will be debating what matters. And I should emphasize
that I totally agree with much, if not most, of what Victor says.
16. Professor Stewart Macaulay is the Malcolm Pitman Sharp Hilldale Professor and
Theodore W. Brazeau Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin.
17. Stewart Macaulay, The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of
Relationships, Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules, 66 MOD. L. REV. 44
(2003).
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I fell down the rabbit hole to the land of empiricism because I
talked to my father-in-law, Jack Ramsey. He was the retired CEO of
S.C. Johnson & Sons in Racine, Wisconsin. I was a 27-year-old
beginning Contracts teacher, and Jack asked me about my Contracts
course. I was teaching out of Fuller on Contracts.8 This seemed a safe
move because so many other Contracts teachers were using it, and it
had the reputation of being a serious book by a famous scholar. When
I described my course, Jack laughed. That was not the reaction that a
27-year-old beginner wanted from a man with so much experience in
national and international business. He described a business world
where long-term continuing relationships provided their own norms
and sanctions. Contract law was either unnecessary or something far
at the margins of the way things worked. He pushed me to talk to
others, and they confirmed his view that contract law applied to but a
limited subset of situations.
At a panel on Contracts at the Association of American Law
Schools meeting in 2005, I used an analogy to the story of the U.S.S.
San Francisco.19 This nuclear submarine was cruising at about 500 feet
below the surface near Guam. It was running at top speed and ran
into an underwater mountain that was not shown on its navigational
charts. I fear that too much contracts scholarship is like cruising
without an accurate chart. We are told that a certain rule or approach
will lead to efficiency. Too often, however, the analysis fails to take
into account the way contract law is delivered. It is easy to talk about
efficiency, but it is hard to know whether any particular rule or
approach will produce an efficient result in the real world.
I really like Victor's work, although I do not always come out at
the same place. Essentially, Victor comes out of transaction planning,
and he wants courts to pay close attention to formal contract
documents fashioned by those planning a deal. I think he wants the
lawyers' and economists' work to control the sales people, and he
wants the engineers to try to perform the contract. There are some
places where I would at least suggest qualifications. The qualifications
may not be fair because I will pick up some marginal ones from
Victor's text; however, they are the ones I know. Victor talks about
the firm offer and looks at the opposite approaches of Learned Hand
and Roger Traynor.' Hand was the great formalist commercial lawyer
18. LON L. FULLER, BASIC CONTRACr LAW (1947).
19. See Stewart Macaulay, Contracts, New Legal Realism, and Improving the
Navigation of The Yellow Submarine, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1161 (2006).
20. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 377.
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who would not let reliance on an offer alone serve to make it
enforceable.2 ' Traynor was the legal realist who loved to fashion new
legal rules. Traynor would protect a general contractor or an owner
who relied on a bid.22
Fred Konefsky dug into the background of the two famous
opinions, James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc. and Drennan v. Star
Paving Co. Konefsky tells us that it is crystal clear that Traynor set
out to write an opinion rejecting Hand's approach.' Traynor found a
case he could use as a vehicle and twisted the facts-at least a little-
to fashion a new rule protecting reliance on bids. According to Victor,
it does not make much difference whether you go with Hand or
Traynor. If a bidder does not stand behind his mistaken bid and
absorb the loss, he will be in great trouble in future transactions. Most
of the time this is true, but occasionally it is not. In our casebook, we
use a federal decision that raises the problem, Janke Construction Co.
v. Vulcan Materials Co.24
The University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee wanted to install an
air conditioning system. As part of the job, bidders had to pipe the
waste water some distance out into Lake Michigan. The state
engineers required that a certain kind of pipe be used to withstand the
water pressure of the lake. The request for bids stated that this
particular pipe must be used, but the bid added the phrase "or equal."
A general contractor talked with a pipe supplier seeking a price for
what the university job required. The supplier quoted a price but
failed to inform the general contractor that he planned to supply pipe
that fell within the "or equal" clause. This price was significantly
lower than the price most suppliers had quoted for the state-specified
pipe. The general contractor put in a bid based on the supplier's price
and won the award. However, the state engineers would not accept
the supplier's pipe as "equal" to the specified pipe. The court followed
the Traynor rule and found that the general contractor's reliance was
reasonable. The supplier was liable for the increased cost of getting
pipe that complied with the state's demands. This general contractor
was a smaller firm that did not buy much from the pipe supplier.
21. See generally James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933)
(holding that offer was withdrawn before it was accepted, therefore the contract was not
enforceable).
22. See generally Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) (affirming
judgment for Plaintiff when Plaintiff relied on a subcontractor's mistaken bid).
23. Alfred S. Konefsky, Freedom and Interdependence in Twentieth-Century Contract
Law: Traynor and Hand and Promissory Estoppel, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 1169, 1169 (1997).
24. 386 F. Supp. 687 (W.D. Wis. 1974), aff'd, 527 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1976).
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Relational norms and sanctions were not enough to get the supplier to
stand behind its mistaken bid.
I like this result. Of course, the court did not need to adopt the
Traynor view of Restatement section 90. The court could have worked
with ideas such as negligent misrepresentation or a duty to disclose
that would show that the bid was based on an interpretation of the "or
equal" clause in the state's request for bids. A number of tools were
available to get the result I want.
Victor shows us how parties could structure their transactions to
avoid these problems. Of course, he is right-they could do this.
However, construction people are rather casual about writing detailed
contracts and holding to them. Some wonderful Dilbert cartoons
reflect engineers' views of lawyers planning transactions, mocking the
lawyers' tendency to plan for improbable events. I think the chance
that courts might find liability puts just a little more pressure on the
parties to work out a settlement. In the Janke case, the pipe supplier
was held liable. In the future, other suppliers in this position will have
an incentive to stand behind their mistake or find a way to settle.
Victor also talks about one of my favorite cases, Nanakuli Paving
& Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., Inc.25 Victor calls the case one of the
"Terrible Twosome." He mentions the case in a chapter called, "Do as
They Say, Not as They Do. 26 Here Victor and I disagree. Nanakuli
involved a long-term requirements contract between Shell and its
Hawaii distributor. Shell's Hawaii representative worked closely with
the distributor and knew about paving industry practices. Nanakuli's
officials acted, in many ways, as if their firm was part of Shell Oil.
Legally they were separate entities, but practically, they were one
operation. The language of the written requirements contract stated
that the price would be Shell's posted price at the time of delivery.
However, the distributor had to bid on state highway paving contracts
and use Shell's price at the time it made the bid. The distributor could
be bound to a losing contract if Shell raised the price significantly
between the time the distributor submitted the bid and the time the
state awarded the contract. Clearly, Shell Oil wanted its distributor to
bid on highway paving contracts. This was Shell's primary way of
selling asphalt.
An industry practice called "price protection" allowed the asphalt
supplier to give its distributor the price at the time it made its bid,
despite the literal term of their contract. Sand and gravel suppliers
25. 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981); GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 162-88.
26. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 162-88.
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also followed this practice in highway construction. Shell price
protected Nanakuli on the only two occasions when it had raised
prices during the time that Nanakuli was awaiting the results of a bid
to the state. However, asphalt sales were moved from one division
within Shell to another, and new executives took over. They decided
the practice of price protection would no longer be followed. Their
decision reflected the impact of the increases in the prices of
petroleum products and the reaction of the United States government,
which imposed price controls on most petroleum products but not on
asphalt. As a result, the posted price increase was much greater than it
had been in the past when Shell price protected. However, Shell's
notice to their distributors was not clear. Shell did not say it would no
longer offer price protection. Nanakuli entered a bid for a state paving
job based on Shell's price when the bid was calculated. Shell raised the
price of asphalt drastically after the bid was submitted but before it
was accepted by the state. The state then accepted Nanakuli's bid,
binding it to a highly disadvantageous contract, which was a factor in
Nanakuli's later bankruptcy.
The Ninth Circuit found that Shell's failure to price protect
Nanakuli constituted a breach of contract. First, the court relied on
usage of trade. Under the UCC, this is "any practice or method of
dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or
trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect
to the transaction in question., 27 The court found that Shell was bound
by the practices of Chevron, the other supplier of asphalt in the
Hawaiian Islands, and by the practices of sand and gravel companies.
Second, the court found that there was a course of dealing between
the parties. This is "a sequence of previous conduct between the
parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as
establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their
expressions and other conduct." 28 Although Shell had price protected
Nanakuli on only two prior occasions, these were the only two times
when the problem arose. A course of dealing and any usage of trade
"supplement or qualify terms of an agreement."'2 9
As I understand Victor's objection to the court's opinion, he
thinks that the document that allowed Shell to increase its posted
prices should control. If it did, then those running Shell could read the
contract and know what they could and could not do. If trade usage
27. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (2004).
28. Id. § 1-205(1).
29. Id. § 1-205(3).
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and course of dealing "supplement or qualify terms," then those who
run large business bureaucracies cannot be sure of their rights and
duties. Those at the home office in San Francisco cannot be sure just
what had been going on in the field. Often, of course, the problem
turns into one of authority under agency law. We have to ask whether
firms in Nanakuli's place should rely on anything but the literal text of
a contract regardless of what other firms in Shell's place or other firms
in the industry say or do. The problem is a common one. I call it the
conflict between the paper deal and the real deal. Or we can view it as
the conflict between the lawyers and other transaction planners and
the people in the field who perform the contract. Mix agency law with
the parol evidence rule and waiver and you have a fine mess.
I am less sympathetic to the home office in the Nanakuli case
because Shell's new executives knew about price protection and
wanted to reject the practice. Victor might say that the amount of the
price increase was so much greater than ever before that earlier
practices should not establish that Shell would go this far in
maintaining its old price. He could object to the court's consideration
of practices in the rock and gravel industries along with the asphalt
industry. Yet why would Nanakuli take the risk of bidding on state
paving contracts if Shell would not price protect? Remember, Shell
wanted Nanakuli to bid on these contracts. Nanakuli had to be the low
bidder fairly often, otherwise Shell would only sell trivial quantities of
asphalt in Hawaii.
Indeed, the Shell executives' position does not seem to be in
Shell's own long-run interest. I have speculated that these executives
wanted to post highly favorable numbers, get promoted, and leave the
consequences to the executives who followed them. If Shell were to
continue to do asphalt business in Hawaii, it would have to find a
replacement for Nanakuli because the executives' actions destroyed
Nanakuli by pushing it into bankruptcy. You might see the case as one
where Shell waived its written contract provision and then tried to
withdraw its waiver. However, the court found that Shell's attempt to
do away with price protection was ambiguous and perhaps even
designed to not be read or understood. I confess that I have some
sympathy for reasonable reliance on practices by the people in the
field. And I must confess that I have never been a transaction planner
trying to get personnel to go by the book.
We can now turn to Victor's analysis of Aluminum Co. of
America v. Essex Group, Inc.' I find his analysis totally convincing.
30. 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980); GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 348-69.
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The court gets the math wrong and rewrites a contract based on faulty
assumptions. Moreover, this involves protecting a highly skilled and
well-represented major corporation against the mistakes of its
transaction planners-an odd expression of paternalism. Nonetheless,
I see the case as reflecting the old saying, "All's well that ends well."
As I read the facts, the parties wanted a requirements contract.
ALCOA was to supply the aluminum that Essex needed to make
aluminum wire products. Moreover, the plants were close enough to
each other so that ALCOA could deliver aluminum in liquid form and
cut a step out of the manufacturing process. However, Essex wanted a
price much lower than the price others had to pay for this aluminum.
This took place in the 1960s when transaction planners worried about
price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act.3 Perhaps a
lower price to Essex could have been cost justified, but the transaction
planners decided to sidestep the problem by manipulating the form of
the transaction. The parties created a "toll conversion" contract.
ALCOA was not selling aluminum to Essex. It was only selling the
service of converting Essex's bauxite into aluminum. Thus, one could
not compare the price that Essex paid with the price paid by other
customers that bought aluminum from ALCOA. Of course, this was a
triumph of form over substance. Where did Essex get its bauxite? It
bought it from one of ALCOA's subsidiaries and transported it on
ALCOA's ships.
Then the world changed. The Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) raised energy prices greatly, and the
production of aluminum (or the converting of bauxite into aluminum)
required large amounts of electrical energy. The demand for
aluminum increased greatly and prices went up. Essex found that it
had a very good deal. Instead of using the product, Essex paid $0.36 a
pound and resold it at $0.73, in other words, at a $0.37 per pound
profit. Had this been written as a requirements contract, Essex could
not have done this. Under section 2-306(1) of the UCC, a buyer may
demand only the "actual... requirements as may occur in good
faith. 32 Essex was not buying its requirements for making things from
aluminum wire. Essex had gone into the metal business. I do not think
that ALCOA had considered this risk.
Judge Teitelbaum used an expansive view of mistake,
impossibility, and frustration to excuse ALCOA from performing the
contract as written. Teitelbaum thought that a complete excuse would
31. Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2000).
32. U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (2004).
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be unfair. As a result, he rewrote the escalator clause in the contract.
Victor raises major questions about the judge's assumptions and
conclusions. Other writers on Contracts have debated this case almost
endlessly. In our casebook, we sample much of this debate about
rewriting contracts so that the written deal reflects what a judge sees
as the real deal.33 Then we ask, what happened next? Judge
Teitelbaum's revised escalator clause never went into effect. Essex
appealed the case to the Third Circuit, and that court unsuccessfully
tried to push the parties to settle before oral arguments. After oral
arguments, we report: "ALCOA indicated an interest in settling the
case. The parties conferred at length, with ALCOA giving ground in
its demands. It appears that the case was settled on the basis that the
original contract would continue in effect until December 31, 1981;
that during the balance of the original time of the contract, ALCOA
would sell at a more favorable price; and that ALCOA would extend
the time of the contract for a period of five years on a favorable price
basis, albeit not as favorable as during the contract period." In
essence, they enlarged the pie and cut it a little differently. Essex got a
good price, but not the "you-can't-believe-it good price" it had under
a literal reading of the original escalator clause.
A cynic or a realist might argue that Judge Teitelbaum's rewriting
of the contract was the best of all possible solutions. He produced a
result that ALCOA liked, but ALCOA did not feel confident that it
had defended successfully on appeal. Essex was moved away from its
unreasonably favorable reading of the deal. As a result, the world
changed so that the parties had a reason to work out a settlement that
continued their relationship on a basis that each could see as better
for it. Samuel Gross and Kent Syverud argue that the function of trials
in the American legal system is not dispute resolution; rather, trials
serve to deter other trials, and they carry out this function most
successfully?' Trials, or the threat of them, provoke settlement in
many cases.
Perhaps all is well because it ended well in the ALCOA case. But
there was no necessary reason that the judge's reworking of the
express term of the contract would produce a good settlement.
Settlements can be good, bad, or indifferent. The court could have just
taken a hard line approach. ALCOA was a major corporation that
could afford the best transaction planners. They wrote a contract price
33. MACAULAY, KIDWELL & WHITFORD, supra note 5, at 695-701.
34. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System
Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 63 (1996).
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for an unlimited quantity that proved to be very unfavorable and that
may not have reflected the parties' actual assumptions of risks. If the
court had refused to rework the contract, ALCOA and all other
transactors would have a powerful incentive to plan better in the
future.
We might prefer a variation on this approach. In the
Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation,35 Judge
Merhige read the contract very literally so that Westinghouse could
not escape liability for its promise to remove spent uranium rods from
a nuclear power plant. However, he then attempted to coerce the
parties into a settlement. As part of the process, he required the
parties to appoint a panel of nuclear engineers to assist in finding a
resolution. This panel found a technical solution. The cooling ponds
could be reworked so that all of the rods produced during the life of
the plant could be stored there while awaiting a governmental
solution to the problem of nuclear waste. Merhige was famous, or
infamous, as a judge who settled big cases rather than tries them.36 It
was said that he gathered the CEO's of utilities and Westinghouse on
his sun porch and fed them mint juleps. He forced executives to confer
without their lawyers and appointed the dean of a law school to act as
a mediator so that executives of one utility could be sure that they
were not settling for less than what another utility gained.
Do we want hard, cold, and pure rules so that contract litigation
becomes as predictable as possible? It is far easier to propose that we
have such rules than to draft them. Do we want a measure of
uncertainty so that parties will have incentives to avoid the risks of
judges rewriting their deals or twisting their arms to do what they
could have done before litigation? These questions face those of us
worried about contract law. Victor's work moves us toward thinking
about the law in action rather than systems that please scholars. His
book is a must for everyone in this field.
35. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D.
Va. 1981), rev'd in part, 826 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1987).
36. Ronald J. Bacigal, An Empirical Case Study of Informal Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 2-3 (1988).
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Professor Keith Rowley: 37
Good morning. I am delighted to be here and pleased to be on
my second panel with Stewart Macaulay. Stewart moderated a panel I
was on at the Law and Society Association in Las Vegas last year. As
for Mark Gergen, many of you have heard me say that I teach
Contracts in spite of my Contracts professor, not because of him. Let
me reiterate that Mark was not my Contracts professor. I took Tax
from Mark, not Contracts. I wanted to go last both out of deference to
two people who I felt had much more depth of experience and insight
to bring to bear and because it let me cherry pick what I wanted to
say.
I want to address three chapters from Victor's book. First, I want
to talk about the opening chapter, which deals with something that
Victor refers to as the "net profits puzzle. 38 He laid this trap for me
by making the whole chapter about the movie industry, and I love the
movie industry. Then I want to talk about the second chapter, which
deals with Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon.39 And then I would like
to address Chapter Six, which deals with Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing
Corp.' So I am just taking the two "best effort" cases that Victor
addresses at some length and will have some questions and general
comments. Let me make a few general comments first.
One of the things about this book that makes it highly accessible
to any reader is that, while it is based on an economic framework, it is
not heavy on economics. There are not a lot of quadrilateral
equations, charts, or results for regression analyses running through
this. What Victor really seems to be talking about, certainly in these
chapters and in others as well, is understanding the little economics;
the economics of everyday life. Then you have a context in which
these cases arise. It really is, more than anything else, an exercise in
economic anthropology. He really digs into cases and chooses to
illustrate some of his broader points by focused discussion of cases-
oftentimes calling on factual material that apparently was either
overlooked or unavailable to the judges who decided the case. I think
that is fascinating. It is an interesting way of getting into various
contract stories. There are plenty of other interesting cases out there
37. Professor Keith A. Rowley is currently the Charles E. Tweedy, Jr. Visiting
Chairholder at the University of Alabama School of Law. He is also a Professor of Law at
the William S. Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada Las Vegas.
38. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 13-41.
39. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917); GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 43-73.
40. 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979); GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 142-61.
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that have not been written about but are ripe for the same kind of
analysis.
A second general comment is with respect to economics. I feel
somewhat comfortable talking about this because I was an Economics
professor before I went to law school. Victor didn't drink the Kool-
Aid; nor have I. We see economics as a very useful tool in
understanding, explaining, or at least rationalizing a lot of things. In
fact, there is a wonderful little quote in the introduction where Victor
says, "[A] little economics can go a long way in helping to decide
contract disputes."4 To Victor's quote I would add, "to understand
each side of a contract dispute and, perhaps, to criticize the parties
and the resolution of their dispute." This is not "Chicago School"
economics; this is not any particular brand of economics. Rather, it is
just the small "e" economic analysis of the law, which is something
that I enjoy doing and teaching.
Mark and Stewart alluded to context. Context is certainly the
motive force behind much of Victor's discussion of the cases. As any
good, latter-day legal realist would agree, you have to understand the
context in which the parties entered into the contract in order to
understand the contract, and in order to adjudicate, arbitrate, or
mediate any dispute that might arise between or among them. And
yet, there may be tension between, on the one hand, paying attention
to subjective context-including things like trade usage, course of
dealing, and course of performance-and, on the other hand, focusing
on what a reasonable person in the position of the buyer or seller
would have understood when they were entering into this contract.
In his chapters on Wood v. Lucy and Bloor v. Falstaff, Victor
argues that we should look at the language of the contract and what
these parties agreed to. If it is clear by reading the contract what the
parties agreed to, we should ignore the context. (As an aside,
terminology Victor deploys in these discussions is probably as
"economic" as anything in the book, writing about asymmetric
information, transaction costs, and timing issues.) So, look at what the
parties wrote and enforce what they wrote unless what they wrote is
not really clear. In that case put it in context. But, how do we tell
whether it is clear? The UCC and the Second Restatement take the
position that you judge clarity by looking at the context. 2 Victor
seems to suggest judging clarity without looking at the context and
41. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 6.
42. See U.C.C. §§ 1-303, 2-202 (2004); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
202 (1979).
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only going to the context afterwards.
This really is a nice book, and it is an excellent read. The book
raises a lot of questions that it does not answer, not intentionally. And
in many of the questions that it does answer, the answers are not given
as if edicts from on high. The chapters are a thought exercise.
With that lengthy introduction out of the way, the first thing I
want to scrutinize more closely is a chapter that, in some respects, is
very different from the others. It is certainly different from the other
two that I will address. It is the very first chapter in the book, where
Victor discusses the "net profits problem" in the context of motion
picture contracts, and the idea that there are multiple types of
compensation.4 There are development fees, which are paid whether
the project gets made or not. And there are fixed fees, which are paid
only if the project actually gets made. So they are really not fixed; they
are contingent on the movie going forward.
The chapter discusses the value of the net profit participation
when the vast majority of films never show any profit because of the
peculiar ways that Hollywood does accounting. It seems only fitting to
illustrate this discussion with a film clip. But rather than use a more
"contemporary" example, such as Robert Altman's studio backlot
drama The Player,' I want to transport you back about 400 years or so
to a memorable scene from Shakespeare in Love:
45
Fennyman: Henslowe, do you know what happens to a man who
doesn't pay his debts? His boots catch fire!
Cut to playhouse interior where the proprietor, Henslowe, is
trussed up with his boots being held to a burning brazier by
Lambert, one of Fennyman's associates. Fennyman, to whom
Henslowe is indebted, interrogates Henslowe and instructs
Lambert while Fennyman's clerk, Frees, watches. Henslowe
moans in agony.
Fennyman: Why do you howl when it is I who am bitten? What
am I, Mr. Lambert?
Lambert: Bitten, Mr. Fennyman.
Fennyman: How badly bitten, Mr. Frees?
Frees: Twelve pounds, one shilling, and four pence, Mr.
Fennyman, including interest.
43. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 13-36.
44. THE PLAYER (Fine Line Features 1992).
45. SHAKESPEARE IN LOVE (Miramax Films 1998).
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Henslowe: (moan) I can pay you.
Fennyman: When?
Henslowe: (moan) Two weeks. Three weeks at the most. Oh, for
pity's sake.
Fennyman (to Lambert): Take them out.
Lambert pulls a rope lifting Henslowe's boots away from the
brazier. Henslowe sighs with relief
Fennyman (to Henslowe): Where will you find...
Frees: ... Sixteen pounds, five shillings, and nine pence ...
Fennyman:... including interest, in three weeks?
Henslowe: I have a wonderful new play.
Fennyman (to Lambert): Put them back in.
Lambert looses the rope, moving Henslowe's boots back toward
the fire.
Henslowe: (moan) It's a comedy.
Fennyman: Cut off his nose...
Lambert brandishes a knife and holds it under Henslowe's nose.
Henslowe: It's a new comedy by William Shakespeare...
Fennyman:... and his ears.
Lambert retrains the knife to the base of Henslowe's right ear.
Henslowe: ... and a share. We will be partners, Mr. Fennyman.
Fennyman: Partners?
Fennyman motions for Lambert to desist. Lambert does so
grudgingly, then pulls the rope again to lift Henslowe's boots
from the fire.
Henslowe: It's a crowd-tickler: mistaken identities, shipwreck,
Pirate King, a bit with a dog, and love triumphant.
Lambert: I think I've seen it. I didn't like it.
Henslowe: But this time it is by Shakespeare.
Fennyman: What's it called?
Henslowe: Romeo and Ethel, the Pirate's Daughter.
Fennyman: Good title.
Fennyman motions for Lambert to untie Henslowe.
Fennyman: A play takes time. Find the actors. Rehearsals. Let's
say we open in two weeks.
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Fennyman throws open the stage curtain and walks toward where
the audience would stand and sit.
Fennyman: That's what, 500 groundlings at two pence a head; in
addition, 400 backsides at three pence - a penny extra for
cushions. Call it 200 hundred cushions. Say, two performances
for safety. How much is that, Mr. Frees?
Frees: Twenty pounds to the penny, Mr. Fennyman.
Fennyman: Correct.
Henslowe: But I have to pay the actors and the author.
Fennyman: Share of the profits.
Henslowe: There's never any...
Fennyman: Of course not.
Henslowe: Oh, Mr. Fennyman. I think you might have hit upon
something.
Fennyman: Sign there.
Fennyman gestures to a piece of parchment that Frees has
prepared. Henslowe, his hands still bound, does his best to make
his mark while Frees tries to assist by moving the parchment
around the stationary quill.
Fennyman: So, Romeo and Ethel, the Pirate's Daughter. Almost
finished?
Henslowe: Oh, without doubt he's completing it at this very
moment.
That part of this chapter is fun to read. In some ways, it sets the
table for the whole book; in other ways, it is a bit of a teaser because it
does not follow quite the same path as most of the book: it does not
focus on a landmark case as the launching off point. But, it is probably
the chapter in which Victor does the most economic heavy lifting,
realizing that the heavy lifting here is nothing like the heavy lifting
that he would do in an economics journal article. The idea is that you
have superstars, whether they are actors, directors, producers, or
other forms of talent. Then you have the other people that get
involved in taking an idea and ultimately making it into a movie. And,
of course, you have the studio, in most cases, that wants to dip its beak
into the money trough as well.
Interestingly, because of the way net profits work, the medium-
talent people, besides getting a salary or fixed payment, get a share of
net profits. But the net profits are calculated after the Tom Cruises,
John Travoltas, Nicole Kidmans, and Halle Berrys of the world take
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their share of the gross profits. The net profits quite often end up
being negative. Fortunately, none of the net profit participants have to
pay back the studio. Victor makes a convincing case for why talent in
Hollywood-talent that is not at the level where it can command gross
profit participation-is willing to take a net profit deal. When
someone talks about hitting different points on a movie, they are
talking about gross profits. Two different stories are there, not at all in
conflict with one another. One story deals with relational contracting.
If I want to work with this studio or with these actors again, or if I
want them to make my next movie, I will agree to take net profits.
Even though I may not actually see any direct financial compensation
in the form of a net profits payment for this film, if we do a good job
on this film, they will want to make another film with me. If that one is
successful as well, I will become someone who commands gross profits
rather than net profits.
The other interesting point concerning the so-called "fixed
payment" that most talent receives is that the payment is not really
fixed at all. It is paid when the movie is actually made. You get a
development fee if you are a producer, a writer, or perhaps a director
who comes in early on, but that fee is very small. Then there is some
fixed compensation, which is certainly nontrivial to a room full of law
professors. After that, there is profit participation, which is good if it is
gross and not so good if it is net. Victor makes the argument that net
profit participants are willing to cede their right to receive net profits
to allow gross profit participants to come into the movie later in the
process. The gross profit participants essentially squeeze out the net
profit participants because those gross profit participants make it
more likely that the movie will actually be made. Therefore, the net
profit participants will get their fixed fee. So, I get $2,500 for an option
to make a movie out of my script. I get another $250,000 if they
actually make a movie out of my script. I get ten percent of all net
profits if the movie goes to distribution. If the movie is not made, I do
not get my $250,000, much less my net profit. If giving up my net
profits means bringing John Travolta, Charlize Theron, Martin
Lawrence, or whoever will make this movie go, I have an incentive to
do that; that incentive probably only makes sense when considered in
economic terms.
Let me shift to Wood v. Lucy,4 a case with which I am going to
assume a high degree of familiarity. If you read the book though, you
will find that your high degree of familiarity is wrong, or not nearly as
46. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
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complete as you thought. Do not feel too badly, because Cardozo did
not really know what he was talking about either-or at least, that is
what Victor would have us believe. Lucile, Lady Duff-Gordon entered
into a contract to allow Otis Wood to be her exclusive agent. Wood
was to place endorsements for her and arrange other contracts for her.
In return, Wood promised to pay Lucy fifty percent of the revenues
from whatever he arranged for her.
After a year or so, Lucy went behind Wood's back and made a
deal directly with Sears Roebuck and with an automobile company.
Wood argued that Lucy could not do that because she made him her
exclusive agent; therefore, Lucy would have to pay him the money
that would be due to him had she let him make those arrangements
for her. Wood had to show that he gave valuable consideration to
Lucy in exchange for her promise to let him keep fifty percent of the
revenues. The problem is that, looking at the express terms of the
contract, nothing in the contract required Wood to do anything. Was
there an obligation to go forth on a weekly or monthly basis, make a
certain number of phone calls, or pursue so many leads? Wood was
not, by the terms of the contact, obligated to do anything other than
pay Lucy fifty percent of whatever revenues he attracted from using
Lucy's name. To make this contract enforceable, Judge Cardozo
implied a duty of reasonable efforts.
This reminds me of a discussion I was having the other day in
class about Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico,47 where the court
basically decides that a company that is sending people to Alaska to
fish for, catch, and process salmon would not put defective fishing nets
on the ship. Therefore, the court rejects the sailors' argument that the
nets on the ship were defective. Apparently, the court made that
decision without ever actually doing any discovery to see whether
there was proof that the nets were defective.
In Lucy, Wood surely would not have promised to pay Lucy fifty
percent of any revenues he generated by using her name if he had not
implicitly promised to actually use her name. Cardozo implied an
obligation on Wood to make this a bilateral contract, where one party
promises to seek ways to market the other's name, and the other party
promises to let the first party keep fifty percent of whatever he earns
off of the other's name. Cardozo went a step further and imposed this
implied duty of reasonable efforts because of the exclusivity of the
arrangement. Accordingly, Wood had to use reasonable efforts to try
and place Lucy's name on things in order to generate income for him




This exercise in economic and legal anthropology unveils for us
another case involving Wood, only this time with Rosie O'Neill, the
creator of the Kewpie doll.8 The case arose in close proximity to
Wood v. Lucy. The contract between O'Neill and Wood, unlike the
contract between Lucy and Wood, had an express "best efforts"
clause in it and had language discussing what the exclusivity meant.
As Victor explains it, the contract basically provided that O'Neill
would not use any other agent to represent her, but reserved the right
to make deals on her own. However, if she did, she had to share the
revenues from those deals with Wood. These cases were both filed in
the same court. But the files on both cases are what Victor calls "slim
records., 49 Victor also says that Cardozo clearly did not have access to
the contract between O'Neill and Wood when he was deciding Lucy.
Why not? The files were in the courthouse. All Cardozo had to do was
send the clerk to get it.
Victor discusses another "best efforts" case, Bloor v. Falstaff, in
Chapter Six. In Bloor, IFC, the company that bought Ballantine
when Ballantine was in financial distress, sold the Ballantine brewing
business, distribution network, trademarks, and other intellectual
property to Falstaff. The contract contained seven or eight "best
efforts" clauses. Some of you are probably old enough to remember
Falstaff beer. I do not know whether it is still out there or not, but I
remember the ads when I was young.
The court looked at one of many express "best efforts" clauses to
make sure that Falstaff still marketed Ballantine beer, which
interestingly, according to Victor and the court, was precisely the
same beer that was in the Falstaff can. But Ballantine was a budget
beer and Falstaff a premium beer. So Falstaff sold for more than
Ballantine even though it was the same product. I have heard that
after the second can, all beers are the same. That argument apparently
was not played up enough in the court to make it into the court's
decision.
Another general point I want to make, and one that Stewart and
Mark both alluded to in one way or another, is that there seems to be
a strong sentiment in this book in favor of express terms. That is
consistent with what I tell my students in Contracts every year. The
48. Wood v. Wilson, 151 N.Y.S. 853 (App. Div. 1915); GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at
43-73.
49. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 50.
50. 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979); GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 142-61.
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offeror is the master of the offer. You can put whatever you want in
that contract. If the other party decides they do not want to sign it,
that is fine. But if you had the opportunity to put something in the
contract but did not, and the other party signed it and you signed it,
sometimes that will work against you. Then the court will say, "It is
not really clear exactly what best efforts means, but you could have
spelled it out better and you did not. Therefore, if you were the
drafter of the contract, we are going to essentially contra proferentem
you-we are going to decide that you left it out and that it is not part
of the deal as a result."
Victor's take on Bloor is that there were so many "best efforts"
provisions in the contract that it is not entirely clear what the buyer
undertook, and the court never really seemed to care what the nature
of the transaction was. This was not Wood agreeing to market Lucy's
ongoing apparel lines and continue getting her endorsements. This
was not a coal plant buying its requirement of coal from a coal
producer. This was Ballantine getting out of the beer business
completely and selling its intellectual property and distribution
network to Falstaff. The delayed compensation part of the deal that
had the "best efforts" clause attached to it was not so Ballantine could
make a lot more money and continue to be a prosperous brand. It was
merely a way of financing Falstaff's purchase of Ballantine, rather
than paying cash. It was also a way of indicating to the buyer that the
seller thought it was selling something useful and valuable. Ballantine
agreed to take deferred compensation because it thought the deal
would make plenty of money; therefore, Ballantine was happy to take
a percent per barrel.
Another case near and dear to my heart involves the Black Sox
scandal. I have been working on a project over the last few years, and
I have talked with Victor at some length about it. During the 1919
World Series, several Chicago White Sox players decided to throw the
World Series in exchange for payments from gamblers.52 Based on the
research that I have done and the benefit of having grown up in a
house where baseball was second only to religion, the scam would
never have worked if the conspirators had not convinced the two Hall
of Fame caliber pitchers at the top of the White Sox pitching
rotation-Eddie Cicotte, who to this date holds one of the lowest
51. See Keith A. Rowley, Contract Construction and Interpretation: From the "Four
Corners" to Parol Evidence (and Everything in Between), 69 MIss. L.J. 73, 151 (1999).




career earned run averages for a starting pitcher in the history of
major league baseball, and Claude "Lefty" Williams, who would not
do anything unless Cicotte was going to do it too-to participate in
the scandal. Cicotte had previously told Arnold "Chick" Gandil, who
was trying to organize the fix, that he was not interested and was
going to see Charlie Comiskey, the owner of the team, to try to collect
on the $10,000 bonus that was in his contract if he won thirty games-
a $10,000 bonus over his $5,000 base salary.
So this is an extraordinarily one-sided exclusive dealing
arrangement where, because of the nature of baseball contracts in the
19-teens, there is no such thing as free agency. Every player signed a
standard form contract provided by the league-either the American
League or the National League-in which his team played. Cicotte
basically was a highly paid serf of Comiskey and was paid $5,000 a
year-not so high. Comiskey, when the pennant was wrapped up and
the Sox were sure of playing in the World Series, ordered manager
Kid Gleason to sit Cicotte down so that he would be unable to earn
his thirtieth win and his $10,000 bonus. When Cicotte asked Comiskey
for his bonus, the Old Roman purportedly said "29 is not 30,"
whereupon Cicotte told Gandil that he would join the fix.
Now we all know that, today, an employer cannot fire someone
before the end of year in order to avoid paying them a year-end
bonus. But that is analogous to what Comiskey did to Cicotte. And so
it opens up an area of inquiry for "best efforts." Did the team owe
Cicotte a good faith duty to use best or even reasonable efforts to
allow him to earn the bonus that he so richly deserved?
I will stop there because I want Victor to have a chance to talk
about any or all of the things that Mark, Stewart, and I have said.
Thank you very much.
Professor Victor Goldberg:53
I want to thank you all for your comments. Let me just respond in
an unstructured way here. Let me start with Nanakuli, which is
mentioned as one of the Terrible Twosome." I do not actually analyze
it at all in the book. I spend most of my time on the other terrible one,
Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co.5 I actually read Nanakuli last
53. Professor Victor Goldberg is the Jerome L. Greene Professor of Transactional
Studies at Columbia Law School.
54. Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., Inc., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981);
GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 162-88.
55. 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971); GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 162-88.
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night again-it is a long opinion with virtually no facts. Actually the
one set of facts given are the facts in Columbia Nitrogen. And those
they clearly get wrong.
The problem I have with Nanakuli is that it would have been so
easy to write price protection into the contract if the parties so
desired. And the fact that it was not there suggests that there was a
problem that gave Shell the opportunity to waive the price, if they
wanted, by giving price protection or not. This is an easy way to
understand the case. One thing that is quite remarkable is that the
court looked at what the aggregate (that is, rock) suppliers were
doing; those contracts looked extremely different. There is no reason
to believe that the aggregate contracts look anything like the asphalt
contracts.
This was actually a five-year contract; it was quite unique. The
notion that you can decide what others in the industry do without
looking at what anybody has written strikes me as quite bizarre.
Columbia Nitrogen, which I did examine, involved the only three-year
contract in the entire business. The court did not bother to look at
what any other contracts looked like. In fact, a lot of the decision, at
least in the case itself, concerned what the parties could have included
in the written contract but had failed to do so. Well, if they had
included the terms in the contract, would that matter given the alleged
customs and practices? The implication is that written contracts, in
that case at least, appear to be meaningless. Clearly what the court
found is not an enforceable contract. This does not really help you
much, but that is where the case ends up.
Let me talk about Wood v. Lucy briefly. The thing I found
interesting and that surprised me was to find the Kewpie doll contract,
which-just to get the timing straight-was actually entered into
before Wood v. Lucy and was in litigation before the contract in
Wood v. Lucy was signed. What I could not find in my research-
since I am not an historian or a very good archeologist-was who the
lawyers were that drafted those contracts and whether Wood had the
same lawyer in both contracts. One possible story is that Wood's
lawyer, realizing that his "best efforts" clause was now in litigation
with O'Neill and that she was going to raise his failure to use best
efforts as a counterclaim, deliberately left it out of the Lucy contract.
This I do not know; it is only speculation. What I think is interesting
though, once we get past that, is that Cardozo did not have to find
consideration in this contract. Wood could have lost here, and it
would have been very easy for anybody in the future who wanted




The real problem I have with the opinion is that what was
reasonable efforts, or a peppercorn worth of efforts, which is all
Cardozo needed to find for consideration, became "best efforts" in
section 2-306 of the UCC. All of a sudden we now have a duty being
imposed only because we had to try to find a way to trump up
consideration. But we have no idea what this duty actually is. There
are some states that actually have ruled that "best efforts" clauses as
such are not enforceable because they are too vague, but implied
"best efforts" are enforceable. This has been one of the great
mysteries to me.
Let me turn to Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Co.,56 the "best efforts"
case. One of the problems-and this comes back to everybody's
points-is what to do about context. I am wishy-washy in some sense
about it. I do not like to look at trade usage, etc. I think that can really
lead us into Columbia Nitrogen sort of problems. On the other hand,
when you have terms like "best efforts," which are inherently vague,
you have to do something to give them content. I think that the only
way to give them content is to look at the context in which they are
used.
When I teach the Deals course that Val alluded to earlier, we
often look at merger agreements; these are typically fifty pages,
single-spaced, and probably say "best efforts" or "reasonable best
efforts" or some variation of that phrase fifty or seventy-five times
within the agreement. The agreement will say "material adverse"
effect seventy times. What does "best efforts" mean there? What does
"material" mean? At best you have to determine what it could
possibly mean in the context.
Bloor is one of those peculiar cases where you can figure out
what they should have meant by the context. I prefer to look at what
reasonable, sophisticated people in this position would have meant
when they put "best efforts" in the contract. In that context, it is easy
to see that Judge Friendly got it wrong. If you recall, the "best efforts"
clause litigated in that case involved the royalty payments that
Ballantine was to receive as part of its compensation for the sale of
the distribution network and its brand name. The royalty was fifty
cents per barrel; the royalty clause had a "best efforts" clause in which
Falstaff agreed that it would use best efforts to increase Ballantine's
sales. Now, the first question is, what was that royalty doing in the
contract? Judge Friendly did not ask. The answer Keith alluded to is
56. 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979).
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information asymmetry, the so-called lemons problem. When you are
selling a complicated asset like a firm or a big hunk of a firm, there are
real questions as to what you are selling. How do you deal with that?
Often what we see are representations, warranties, conditions, and
due diligence. These are normal ways of dealing with this information
asymmetry-the fact that the seller knows something about what he is
selling that the buyer does not.
In this case, they deliberately did none of that. Ballantine sold the
assets "as is." That is pretty scary. You are going to spend millions and
all you are getting is "as is." In order to assure Falstaff that the assets
were worth something, Ballantine made the bulk of its compensation
contingent upon the quality of the assets. That is essentially what this
royalty did. If they had sold what they had been selling over the
previous years, the royalty would have been about $5 to $6 million
over and above the $4 million sale price. So roughly half of the value
of the deal was essentially in this royalty.
Now, that is the context. So then the question is: Given that this
amounted to an earnout transaction, what is the role of the "best
efforts" clause? What I argue is that the problem that the parties had
was that Ballantine was really selling two assets; it was selling the
Ballantine brand name, and it was selling its distribution network,
which could be used for other things such as selling Falstaff beer. The
royalty was essentially a meter on the quality of the Ballantine brand
name. However, it would not have been too hard for Falstaff to decide
they no longer wanted to sell Ballantine beer and instead sell Falstaff
beer through the Ballantine distribution network. Basically, Falstaff
could cheat Ballantine by diverting business away from the meter (the
royalty). The "best efforts" clause, I suggest, was there to try to
prevent that cheating. Now, that would still be difficult to litigate in
principle. Suppose we found out that forty percent of the beer being
sold to the network was Ballantine and sixty percent was Falstaff. Is
that "best efforts"? You can see how there would be many problems
litigating this.
The facts of the case make it easy. Paul Kalmanovitz purchased
Ballantine and dismantled its entire distribution network. Falstaff was
not diverting anything. So there was no diversion, and therefore there
was no violation of the "best efforts" clause, at least as I interpret it.
The problem was that Falstaff had bought two lemons. The nice thing
about that case, in one sense, is that you can actually come to a fairly
clean result. The unfortunate part is that it does not generalize. You
will see very few other "best efforts" cases like this. However, "best
efforts" is something that is inherent in many cases. While the Bloor
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analysis does not generalize, the approach does. The contract Judge
Friendly constructed for the parties had Falstaff promise that it would
use the assets it purchased suboptimally. Since restrictions on future
use should make the asset less attractive to the buyer, the question
that should have arisen is: why would a rational seller impose such a
restriction? When the question is properly framed, the answer comes
into focus: the royalty dealt with the lemons problem and the best
efforts clause was to police cheating.
Mark mentioned Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co. 7 I
actually drafted something on this a few months ago and sent it to
Dick Posner, the judge who wrote the Lake River opinion. Posner
responded and we had a brief e-mail correspondence on it. Strangely
enough, he still thinks he is right. My argument turn on one of the
facts, left out of the opinion and buried in the contract in an obscure
clause. The clause says that Lake River essentially agrees to bag up to
400 tons a week of Carborundum's product. Most of you probably
have only a vague recollection of this case, so I will back up. This was
a three-year contract in which Lake River agreed to bag at least
22,500 tons of Carborundum's product and Carborundum agreed to
pay Lake River for those 22,500 tons. Carborundum only sent 12,000
tons of product. Lake River sued claiming Carborundum owed Lake
River for the other 10,500 tons that Carborundum did not send.
Carborundum argued that the clause was a penalty clause. Posner
reluctantly agreed that it was a penalty clause and, therefore, was
unenforceable.
Posner also argued that this does not mean that "take-or-pay"
contracts are unenforceable, because "take-or-pay" contracts are
different. But as Mark and I certainly agree, they are not different. So
what is going on here? What Lake River promised to do was to stand
ready for a three-year period to bag whatever was sent, up to the 400
tons per week. Carborundum was getting something valuable-
flexibility-and was willing to pay for it. On the other side, providing
that flexibility was costly for Lake River. It had to forego other
opportunities and remain ready, willing, and able to perform.
The real deal is a bargain over this flexibility where one party
values it, and it is costly for the other party to provide. They managed
to find a mutually agreeable price ex ante, but this was undone by the
court. I think it is important to realize-and this really is a central
theme of the book, particularly Chapter Five-flexibility is often
valuable to one party and costly to provide for the other. Contracts
57. 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985).
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will reflect that by granting discretion to one party, but confronting
that party with consequences (a price) for the exercise of that
discretion.
Now, I have one other disagreement with Posner on this case.
According to Posner's analysis, if Carborundum breached on the first
day, it would have owed Lake River the full amount of the contract,
$533,000. I tried to tell him that I do not think that is right. If
Carborundum breached on the first day, then there would be a duty to
mitigate. Lake River had this capacity freed up to do other things, and
the revenue they get from doing those other things should be
subtracted from that $533,000. Posner disagrees. Because it is a
stipulated damage clause, even though it does not say that,
Carborundum would have to pay $533,000 regardless, and there would
be no mitigation. But I think once you recognize that anticipatory
repudiation of a three-year contract or a "take-or-pay" contract is
different from not taking the amount after the contract has been
performed, you have a very different analysis of the case and get a
different outcome.
In conclusion, I want to emphasize the basic theme of the book,
namely that an understanding of the economics of transactions will be
valuable for analyzing contract disputes and doctrine.
I think I have used up my time. We will leave the rest of the time
for open discussion.
Professor Stephen A. Smith:
I am Professor Stephen Smith from McGill University. I have an
observation that is prompted by the extent to which the different
commentators were in agreement with the book's arguments. The
observation is that this agreement is not surprising. Whether you care
about vindicating individual rights, efficiency, or fairness, you will care
about giving effect to the intentions of contracting parties.
Whatever normative perspective on contract law is adopted, the
first step in determining what contracting parties should do is to
interpret what the parties have agreed to. Furthermore, I do not think
there is any disagreement, even between authors with very different
normative perspectives, about what interpretation means. At first
blush it may look like there is a debate between authors who say you
need to take context into account when interpreting contracts and
those who say you should not do this. However, I do not think this is a
real debate. Everybody accepts that we should take context into
account. The only question is what that context is. The need to take
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context into account in understanding words is a basic feature of
language. No one believes that you can understand words in isolation.
Let me give an example. Authors who argue that judges should
read a particular contract or type of contract literally and strictly, not
filling or adding any terms, are basically saying that the context in
which such contracts were made is one in which the drafters assumed,
quite reasonably, that the contract's words would be read literally,
strictly, etc. By contrast, authors who argue for a more expansive
interpretation generally assume that the context is one in which the
drafters assumed that their words would be understood more
expansively. This is a point I stress when I teach French and German
lawyers about English contract law. I explain that apparent
differences in how contracts are interpreted in common and civil law
are often not a consequence of different views on interpretation, but
arise from the different cultural contexts in which contracts are
traditionally drafted in these jurisdictions. To illustrate this point, I
often give students two copies of contracts for the purchase of shares,
one written in Germany by a German lawyer, the other written in
England by an English lawyer. Both lawyers belong to the same multi-
national law firm. The German contract is 30 pages long; the English
contract is 160 pages long.
Neither of these lawyers has made a mistake or done a bad job
drafting. Nor did they have different theories about the meaning of
interpretation. Each reasonably expected that judges would take into
account the context in which their contract was drafted. The contexts
did, however, differ. Each lawyer reasonably had different
expectations about how much was going to be filled in by a judge or
anyone else reading the contract. Coincidentally, the English practice
supports Victor's point about how commercial agreements should be
interpreted. The context in which most commercial agreements are
made, at least in England, is one in which it is assumed that the words
in the contract will be read literally and strictly. This is why the last
thing that English lawyers in major commercial practices usually do
before signing a contract, even a 160 page contract, is to get the firm's
lawyers who have worked on the transaction together in a conference
room to read out loud the entire contract, word by word. The lawyers
want to make sure that they mean every single word in the contract.
This does not mean that context is irrelevant when interpreting an
English contract. English judges should and do take context into
account. But the context in which the English contract is drafted is
different from the context in which the German contract is drafted.
Thank you.
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Professor Val Ricks: 18
I wonder how the lawyers were getting paid in each of those
societies.
Professor Smith:
At one point, English lawyers were paid by the word when they
drafted contracts. No doubt that is one reason for the length of
English contracts.
Professor Rowley:
One of the things that interests me about Victor's approach to
context is found in the chapter on Bloor v. Falstaff. Victor comes to
the conclusion that, when terms of a contract are ambiguous, it is
important to look at context-including trade usage, course of
performance, and course of dealing. But if the terms of the contract
are crystal clear, then you should not look at things like course of
dealing, course of performance, or usage of trade.
That raises for me the question of against which background to
assume that sophisticated parties are contracting. Do we assume they
are contracting against a tabula rasa where there are no rules and the
parties are setting them all for themselves? Or, are they assuming that
things like trade usage, course of performance, and prior dealings
among themselves will be part of the contract unless they expressly
contract out of them? I think that promotes a more efficient use of
negotiating and drafting resources by making contracts of the thirty-
page variety rather than the fifty-page variety.
Professor Gergen:
Leon Green made an apt point in this regard in Judge and Jury.59
While he is speaking about the law of misrepresentation, the same
applies to the parol evidence rule. Green wrote:
[T]he elaborate formula with its multitude of sub-formulas ...
permit[s] the judge to range as freely as his judgment dictates ....
58. Professor Val D. Ricks is the Vinson & Elkins Research Professor and a
Professor of Law at South Texas College of Law.
59. LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930).
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... [T]he point to be stressed here is that whatever sort of
judgment is desired, the formulas which have been evolved and
their coteries of attendant phrases provide the most flexible
accommodation without in the least impairing their own
integrity or that of the judicial process. A science of law could
ask little better by way of intellectual machinery for handling
these varied and difficult cases.6°
Green differs from Victor in that he trusts trial judges to get it
right while Victor does not. I tell my students that the parol evidence
rule does not constrain judges. Rather it enables judges to take the
issue of interpretation away from the jury, even when interpretation
turns on contestable issues of fact.
Professor Goldberg:
Let me make two quick responses. First, on the Nanakuli point, I
think it is quite interesting that in the previous two waivers, the price
difference was not quite so high-$2 to $5 difference-whereas this
waiver was going to be for about $30. A second point is about "best
efforts." Professor Linzer said that parties should draft "reasonable
efforts" contracts. What does that mean? When Allen Farnsworth was
my colleague, I asked him what the difference was. Allen said, "Best
efforts, reasonable efforts, reasonable commercial, best efforts all
mean the same thing. Good faith means something different." I asked
him why. Lawyers like nuances, why are there no nuances here? He
could not answer that. If you look just at section 2-306 of the UCC,
Cardozo's "reasonable efforts" have become "best efforts., 61 They are
treated as synonyms a lot of the time. I do not understand how the
drafting change is going to help you with that.
Professor Macaulay:
The only thing that I wanted to add is that the lawyer's
opportunity to draft and plan varies in different situations. We cannot
assume that the parties could have done a great job drafting in every
case. I know a lawyer who has worked for dot-coins for about ten
years. The computer engineers generally think that law and formal
contracts are worthless. Often they have to run their sales past the
general counsel's office. The lawyers are often called "Dr. No"
60. Id. at 311-13 (emphasis omitted).
61. U.C.C. § 2-306 (2004).
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because it seems that all they are good for is ruining sales when they
raise intellectual property issues. The fact that Microsoft might sue us
because our license to use a Microsoft product probably does not
cover the use that the sales engineer wants to make does not impress
the engineer. Lawyers always think of the improbable "what ifs."
Lawyers also want to define the "deliverables." Computer engineers
really mean that they are going to come up with a program that will
do cool things, and they will work out just what those cool things are
as they go along. Many of them are not very interested in making
money for the firm; they just want to get on with the project defined
only in the most general terms because they do not want to be pinned
down before they get into the project. At best, the lawyers get a very
short time to review contracts proposed by the engineers, which can
produce some less than perfect language. The lawyers will grab the
language that they have used in the past and tinker with what they see
as they read. Of course, there are situations where the document is
beautifully crafted and every comma has been debated. But we cannot
expect this in every case.
Professor Annette Burkeen:
My name is Annette Burkeen from Salmon P. Chase College of
Law. One of the comments I had when Professor Gergen was talking
about how to constrain judges when interpreting "best efforts" or
"reasonable efforts" clauses is that you do not seem to allow for
strategic vagueness. A "best efforts" or "reasonable efforts" term
might be strategic-that is, the parties may use such term as an
acceptable form of an agreement to agree. As circumstances change
over the course of a contract, the parties may negotiate or renegotiate
whether unforeseen or contingent circumstances justify a
reconceptualization of what conduct complies with the agreement.
The use of such terms may also impliedly signal the parties'
willingness to allow the court to resolve the issue when the parties are
unable to do so. I have not really heard anyone speak to that end.
Professor Rowley:
Victor made a quick allusion to this in his response. One of his
views of Wood v. Lucy-given the prior contract between Wood and
O'Neill and the pending litigation-was that Wood might very well
have drafted a contract to use with Lucy that was intentionally
unenforceable on the theory that most people do what they say they
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are going to do in contracts and it does not end up in litigation; or, if
the parties do not do what they say they are going to do, the dispute is
so small that it is not worth going to court over it. It is not exactly
what you are talking about, but it is along the same vein: that you
might draft in such a way that you can back out. The funny thing in
Wood v. Lucy is that the parties were reversed. It was Wood who
wanted to enforce the contract that he drafted to be unenforceable
and Lucy who argued it was not enforceable because it was for no
consideration.
Professor Goldberg:
I think that you are right. A lot of the times people draft
contracts knowing that there are holes and that they are going to work
things out. Look, for instance, at a basketball contract; you cannot say,
"I'm going to work really hard, honest." Look at Vince Carter when
he was with Toronto; that was clearly a violation of any best efforts.
The other side of that coin is that when you draft a contract really
precisely, when it gets into litigation people will look at it with a
microscope and try to find an ambiguity when before there was none.
That is a more common problem. But you are absolutely right that
people do leave holes, and sometimes they just have to.
Professor Daniel Kleinberger:
My name is Daniel Kleinberger from William Mitchell College of
Law. The law school at which I teach is named after a justice of the
state supreme court who had very much a "four corner" approach. He
was also given to succinct opinions, a fact I found out with great
pleasure when I was asked to prepare remarks on his approach to the
parol evidence rule. He certainly was not paid by the word. His
opinions in this area run about two-pages long.
I wanted to offer just a few observations. One is with regard to
bad drafting. The Delaware Chancery Court recently talked about the
duty to "scriven carefully" while drafting agreements under entity
statutes that give maximum effect to freedom of contract. In essence,
the Court warned the lawyer that it would interpret the contract just
the way he had written it.
In my experience as a commercial lawyer, a lot of drafting
problems come up from very bad lawyering, where the attorney forces
a disconnect between the process of developing a contract and the
process of thinking about the deal. A careful drafting process
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necessarily involves recurrently making sure that the client
understands the document. The document is, after all, describing the
client's deal. I question whether client understanding is possible with a
100-page contract, which is somewhat beyond the bounds of my
comprehension.
The other thing I want to include is that possibly what is
happening in the debate between strict construction and not-so-strict
construction is something comparable to what goes on in the fancy
realm of constitutional adjudication, in particular the allocation of
power between the government and the people. The common law
issue of contractual interpretation implicates the same question. That
is, a more liberal standard of interpretation reallocates power from
the private sector to an arm of the government-the judiciary.
I tell my students that one of the best ways to convert a get-the-
government-out-of-the-economy conservative into a liberal Democrat
is to have the conservative make a deal that he later decides he does
not want. Then, the duty of good faith and fair dealing is invoked, and
he will not see this as an invocation of government power over the
economy. The broader a court's view of good faith, the more power
the government has to reconstruct private deals.
Another thing, which I am going to talk about later in my
presentation, is the statutory approach in business entity law to the
concept of good faith and fair dealing. Over a period of years, the
Uniform Law Commissioners have debated what that actually means.
RUPA says, in effect, "It is a very broad construction. But we do not
really know what this thing is so we leave it to the courts to decide."
Later uniform acts suggest a very narrow construction. What has
shifted-basically-is the philosophy of how much power goes to the
courts.
Mr. Andrew Oh-Willeke:
My name is Andrew Oh-Willeke from McGihon & Associates,
L.L.C. in Denver, Colorado. Professor Gergen was talking about the
notion that we are balancing two kinds of deadweight loss-in the
litigation system, which could be avoided with simpler contract rules,
and in the contracting process, which is invisible but might be just as
much of a bad thing, and that the empirical side of that really matters.
Well, doesn't the experience of Israel really give us a test of how much
deadweight loss the complexity of contract and discovery rules
provide? Israel is doing a real-life experiment. It got rid of its parole
evidence rule and has run its world of contract law without it for quite
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a long time. The remarkable thing is that while everyone argued that
it would clog the courts when that change in the law was made, in
practice it has had almost no impact on litigation cost, which would
suggest the nature of the contract rules are not contributing a lot to
the amount of deadweight loss that goes on in the court. If that is the
case, does having simpler contract rules really make sense?
Professor Gergen:
Israel is fascinating because its supreme court has the capacity to
review every case. The supreme court can adopt rules that vest judges
with enormous discretion, knowing they will have the final say in
every case. In the United States it is very different. This is particularly
true in states like Texas, where the supreme court does not trust some
lower courts.
I do disagree with Professor Kleinberger's claim that this is all
about power. It is about whether we empower people by rules that
bound the discretion of trial judges to do what they thought the
parties meant but did not quite say. Or we empower people by giving
trial judges ex-post discretion to do what they thought the parties
wanted. What is more empowering to people is an empirical question
that turns on judicial competence, people's competence in drafting
contracts, and the like. But Steve nailed it. It is all about trying to
effectuate the parties' intent.
Professor Goldberg:
I just want to make one more point. You talk about writing long
contracts because we have to spell everything out. The other side of
that coin is that if the judges are continually intervening by not
honoring what is in the contracts, you have to write a lot more
elaborate contracts to try to constrain the judges. So it is not quite
clear which is going to end with the longer and more elaborate
contracts.
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